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Introduction
1 Historical inquiry presupposes the possibility of obtaining knowledge of the past. It thus
implies (usually tacitly) an epistemology which can account for this kind of knowledge.
However,  the pragmatist  theory of  knowledge – especially as developed by Peirce or
Dewey – is based on the anticipation of future events in order to verify or falsify the
assumptions made.  For this  reason,  serious doubts have been raised as to whether a
pragmatist theory of knowledge is capable of accounting for historical knowledge at all: if
knowledge is to be tested in the future, how can it possibly be tested by events which
have  already  taken  place  in  the  past?  Such  doubts  have  been  expressed  quite
meticulously  by  Arthur  O. Lovejoy,  who  was  an  important  critical  interlocutor  of
pragmatism, when this style of philosophizing became dominant in North-America in the
early 20th century. The aftermath of Lovejoy’s interventions can be observed in a number
of reactions, including a response by Dewey which opened a debate between the two
renowned philosophers in the Journal of Philosophy.1 However, instead of delving into this
specific  debate,  I  examine  how  C. I. Lewis  dealt  with  the  respective  criticism  while
outlining his pragmatic theory of knowledge. In my view, Lewis’s theory as presented in
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Mind  and  the  World  Order (1929)  is  the  clearest  and  most  comprehensive  account  on
knowledge given from an enhanced pragmatist point of view. Although Lewis gives a
formal answer to the problem of knowledge of the past, he is less concerned with the
practice of historical inquiry. This omission by Lewis requires us to consider how the past
is known through documents that are used as the epistemic instruments which make the
past detectible. Edgar Wind’s regrettably unheeded paper on “Some Points of Contact
between History and Natural Science,” produced in 1936, is concerned with precisely this
issue. 
2 Through a consideration of the related arguments of Lovejoy, Lewis and Wind, I suggest
that a pragmatist theory of knowledge cannot only account for knowledge of the past in
the first place,  but can actually elucidate a basic epistemological feature of historical
inquiry: Knowledge of the past can only be gained by means of anticipation.
 
I. Lovejoy’s Criticism
a) Arthur O. Lovejoy as a Critical Interlocutor of Pragmatism
3 The role of Arthur O. Lovejoy in the history of pragmatism is that of a provoking and
belligerent, though still somehow appreciative (but in any case critical), interlocutor of
the movement. His criticism is noteworthy not least because it was effective within the
pragmatist tradition itself: Lovejoy provoked a great deal of response (direct or indirect)
from  those  who  considered  themselves  to  be  pragmatists –  including  Dewey  and
reportedly  James  –  and  thus  influenced  the  development  of  this  very  movement.
Lovejoy’s critical contribution – which centered on his calls for greater clarification of the
basic concepts of pragmatism as a consistent doctrine – is commonly associated with two
works: his notorious paper on “The Thirteen Pragmatisms,” published in two parts in
1908,  and  a  chapter  on  “Pragmatism  Versus The  Pragmatist”  from  1920.  Although
Lovejoy’s later contribution presents a much more elaborate attempt of criticism and led
to a direct debate with Dewey, his paper on the “Thirteen Pragmatisms,” or at least its
brusque title,  has,  until  recently,  been received more intensely.2 The general  aim of
Lovejoy’s attacks is to offer “a species of Prolegomena zu einem jeden künftigen Pragmatismus
”  (Lovejoy  1908:  39)3 and  to  rectify  what  he  considers  to  be  the  crucial  self-
misunderstandings of this otherwise promising kind of philosophy. The yardstick of this
criticism is the idea of a consistent doctrine that pragmatism should become, and which
shall be defended against “the pragmatist’s” assumed readiness to affiliate his position to
various doctrines. I say “his,” because in Lovejoy’s paper from 1920 “the pragmatist” is
exclusively identified with Dewey as the main representative of this current.
4 At the outset of his article on “Pragmatism Versus The Pragmatist”4 Lovejoy takes pains to
detect the steady position of pragmatism between idealism and realism, which he regards
as  the  mutually  exclusive  foundations  of  presumably  any  philosophical  doctrine.
However,  this  opposition rather reflects  the situation of  American philosophy at  the
beginning of the 20th century than a systematic necessity to keep realism and idealism as
polar opposites. According to this presupposed opposition, pragmatism must either be a
version of realism or of idealism (both either monistic or dualistic)5 – or it must present a
third option. Lovejoy then devotes a great deal of his argument to a lengthy discussion of
quotations from Dewey at different occasions (and partially taken out of context) to show
how  “the  pragmatist”  recurrently  contradicts  himself  in  a  way  that  cannot  be
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harmonized since his claims sometimes fall  in the realist’s  and at other times in the
idealist’s camp. Apart from taking delight in deliberate provocation of the philosophic
community, this exhibition of ambiguities in Dewey’s writings serves Lovejoy to delineate
the field of his aspired reassessment of pragmatism. In the center of this field he puts the
problem of knowledge and approaches it with regard to the existence of mental entities
and, more importantly, knowledge of the past.
 
b) Lovejoy’s Arguments against the Anticipatory Character of
Knowledge
5 While  exploring the  pragmatist’s  stance on the existence of  mental  entities,  Lovejoy
encounters anticipatory knowledge as a key concept in Dewey’s theory6 and detects its
importance  for  the  close  connection  of  knowledge  and  action  which  is  indeed
characteristic  of  philosophical  pragmatism in  general.  Lovejoy  takes  the  suggestions
concerning the concept of  knowledge,  which Dewey presents most extensively in his
Essays in Experimental Logic (2004), as a limited piece of descriptive psychology and attacks
the assumption that every anticipated meaning is closely connected with an operation:
“This amounts to an assertion that we never anticipate without proposing to ourselves
some course of action with reference to the thing anticipated – an assertion which I take
to be a false psychological generalization” (Lovejoy 1920: 52). He objects that there is also
“passive” anticipation of future events (and even quotes James to support this view) and
gives the example of “a windfall of fortune which one can do nothing – and therefore
intends to do nothing – to bring about” (Lovejoy 1920: 52). The scenario that Lovejoy
selects to illustrate his  point,  however,  is  not an example of  knowledge – neither of
knowledge about the event itself, nor about something else that would be rendered true
or false by it – but instead refers to the mere hope for something to happen. Furthermore,
the hope for this “windfall of fortune” is clearly concerning one’s conduct until and after
this event occurs.
6 Although  the  first  objection  is  easily  refutable,  Lovejoy’s  second  one  is  much  more
important and lies at the heart of his criticism. It concerns “Dewey’s limitation of the
‘knowledge-experience’  exclusively to  forward-looking  thoughts,”  which,  as  Lovejoy
rightly observes, means that Dewey “identifies all knowledge with anticipation” (Lovejoy
1920: 52). Lovejoy now tries to turn Dewey against himself – or “pragmatism” against “the
pragmatist” – as he argues that this definition of knowledge “ignores the patent empirical
fact that many of our ‘meanings’ are retrospective – and the specifically pragmatic fact
that such meanings are indispensable in the planning of action” (Lovejoy 1920: 53). This
point seems worthwhile since retrospection is indeed the very source of anticipation:
Experiences we are presently having and those we are going to have are both informed by
reference to former experiences, which are consequently the source out of which we first
gain the assumptions to be tested as knowledge. Lovejoy acknowledges that Dewey is not
actually arguing against this, and he even quotes one of Dewey’s affirmative statements
on this  kind of  inter-temporal  cognition which explicitly emphasizes the meaning of
retrospection.7 He still maintains, however, that Dewey is not systematically integrating
retrospection  into  his  theory  of  knowledge  since  anticipation  remains  the  decisive
element that defines knowledge within this theory.
7 If Lovejoy is right about the systematic lack of retrospection in Dewey’s account, two
mutually exclusive consequences are conceivable. One possibility is that Dewey’s neglect
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indicates  the  “psychological”  one-sidedness  of  his  theory  and  must  be  rectified  by
introducing retrospection as a distinct mode of inter-temporal inference and the strict
opposite of anticipation. Alternatively, Dewey’s oversight can be explained by suggesting
that anticipation, as the basic operational mode of knowledge, must somehow integrate
(or  overlap with)  retrospection.  Only  the  latter  consequence  could  build  on Dewey’s
conception of knowledge. Lovejoy’s decision to only conceive of the former consequence
forces him to opt for the replacement of Dewey’s theory of knowledge by another, yet
unspecified,  theory.  He  does  not  even  consider  the  possibility  of  anticipation  as
integrating  retrospection  and  the  associated  possibility  of  the past  as  an  object  of
anticipatory  knowledge.  Unfortunately,  this  prevents  Lovejoy  from  asking  the  real
question  his  criticism brings  about:  If  all  knowledge  is  contained  in  anticipatory  or
predictive judgments, this must also be true for knowledge of the past;  but how is it
possible  to  “anticipate”  a  past  event  in  a  judgment (without  producing  logical  non-
sense)? Lovejoy is not alone in failing to ask this question. Dewey, who fails to make the
respective implications of his theory explicit, is also guilty of this oversight. Thus, Dewey
passively facilitates misunderstandings such as Lovejoy’s which culminate in the claim
that “[t]he pragmatist  […] manifests a curious aversion from admitting that we have
knowledge, and ‘true’ knowledge, about the past” (Lovejoy 1920: 63). 
8 In order to achieve a more constructive understanding of how to approach the question –
how can the past be anticipated? – I will first consider Lovejoy’s misunderstandings by
examining the three explanations he provides when making sense of what he describes as
Dewey’s  “strange  disinclination  to  acknowledge  the  immense  importance  of
retrospection” and “to recognize the possibility of veridical retrospection” (Lovejoy 1920:
63).
9 According to Lovejoy, the first reason is Dewey’s “moral appraisal” of anticipation as
serving creative intelligence more effectively than retrospection. It is true that Dewey’s
essay “The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy,” which Lovejoy quotes in support of his
accusation, carries such an overtly “moral” plea as regards the role of philosophy in
society.  It  is  also  true  that  Dewey  regards  anticipation  as  “more  primary  than
recollection” (Dewey 1917: 14) in the course of acting towards a goal – which is what
creative intelligence is about. This is in fact how Dewey conceives the process of life,
namely  as  the  constant  process  of  readjusting  the  relationship  of  organism  and
environment,  something  that  involves  the  ongoing  pursuit  of an  ever  passing
equilibrium. Within this bio-evolutionary view one must inevitably conceive “success and
failure” of organic adaption as “the primary ‘categories’ of life” (Lovejoy 1920: 14)8 and to
hold that anticipation is the primary cognitive operation which obeys these “categories.”
In  contrast  to  goal-oriented  or  problem-solving  actions,  operations  of  a  more  (self-)
reflective character, like retrospection, appear “secondary” to the direct practical need
for  anticipation.  One may or  may not  consent  to  the bio-evolutionary foundation of
Dewey’s  philosophical  outlook,  but  one  cannot  say  that  his  prioritization  of  the
anticipatory function was merely a moral postulate without any further (bio-) logical
reason. 
10 Dewey admits then that the “[i]maginative recovery of the bygone,” which in Lovejoy’s
terms is retrospection, “is indispensable to successful invasion of the future, but its status
is  that  of  an  instrument”  (Lovejoy  1920:  14);  it  is  subordinate  to  the  more  general
operation of anticipation. Since Dewey’s essay is about the “Recovery of Philosophy” he
immediately tries to transpose this argument into the business of philosophy. The merits
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of the recovery of the bygone in the pursuit of knowledge remain unquestioned (and
become  apparent  in  Dewey’s  own  work),  but  Dewey  criticizes  the  tendency  of  his
philosophical contemporaries “to isolate the past, dwelling upon it for its own sake and
giving  it  the  eulogistic  name  of  knowledge”  (Lovejoy  1920:  14).  His  attack  is  not,
therefore, directed against recollection or recovery of the past in general, but against the
habit  of  philosophical  discourse to restrict  itself  to “traditional” problems of  bygone
times instead of applying the attitude of “normal” practical life – which is primarily based
on the cognitive function of  anticipation – to their  own business.  Dewey is  guilty of
moving from the level of the biological foundation of practical human conduct to his
postulates  and  polemics  concerning  the  deplorable  condition  of  philosophy  far  too
quickly, leaving certain steps of his argumentation to the reader. He thus, again, leaves
room for the suspicion Lovejoy articulates.
11 Lovejoy then identifies the second reason “why retrospection is the Cinderella of the
pragmatic  theory  of  knowledge”  (Lovejoy  1920:  65)  in  the  problems  that  Dewey  is
understood to  have  in  his  concept  of  “the  past”  as  such.  Lovejoy  observes  that  the
pragmatist “finds it  difficult to see how the data which serve in an inference can be
unaffected by the intent of the inference and by the character of the particular situation
in  which  the  need  for  inquiry  and inference  originates”  (Lovejoy  1920:  65),  which  I
consider to be a generally satisfying description of the attitude of experimental logic.
Lovejoy, however, holds that Dewey fails to acknowledge the fact that the past “is just
blankly there,  unmodifiable,  irremediably external  to the ‘present concrete situation,’
inaccessible to action either present or prospective” (Lovejoy 1920: 65). This statement,
which is suggestive of an utterly un-critical realism, however, is at odds with the historian
of  ideas  Lovejoy  was.9 For  if  the  past  was  blankly  there,  it  would  be  either  totally
disclosed, wholly inaccessible to the inquiring mind (because the mind could not get “
there”); or it would be totally open and accessible in every detail. Neither is the case. Since
he does not further elaborate on the implications of this claim, it is not clear – but rather
unlikely – that Lovejoy would really defend such a view of the past as the absolute totality
of the bygone. Leaving Lovejoy’s intentions aside, it is clear that Dewey’s pragmatism
does not in fact (and could not possibly) entail such a notion of the past. His theory of
knowledge concerns knowledge as emerging from concrete “experimental” interaction,
not  from  the  abstract  correspondence  of  internal  assumptions  with  external  facts
(without knowing what mediates between them). Accordingly,  knowledge of the past,
pragmatically considered, can only be achieved through experimental interaction with
instances  of  the  past  in  a  present  concrete  situation.  Therefore,  Lovejoy’s  negative
assumption only reaffirms what Dewey’s theory is compelled to presuppose, if this theory
shall account for knowledge of the past, namely that the past is accessible to present and
prospective action. (Further consequences of this claim will be discussed below in section
III.)
12 The third reason, which Lovejoy regards as the principle reason for “the pragmatist’s
unwillingness to classify retrospection as true knowledge,” concerns “that subjectivistic
strain in his [the pragmatist’s] thought” (Lovejoy 1920: 65). What Lovejoy has in mind
here is the attitude of “radical empiricism” that was established by James and indeed
became very  influential  within and beyond the  pragmatist  movement.  Although this
particular  attitude  does  not  –  at  least  not  necessarily  –  affect  the  more
“instrumentalistic”  views  of  Peirce  and  Dewey,  Lovejoy  thinks  that  pragmatism  is
altogether pervaded by it.10 By adopting this approach, Lovejoy, who once tried to show
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how  many  independent  doctrines  call  themselves  pragmatism,  imposes  one  special
doctrine  upon  all  other  modes  of  the  pragmatic  attitude.  This  false  generalization
represents  a  common mistake  in  the  reception  of  pragmatism –  which  is  why  it  is
important to take a closer look at this aspect of Lovejoy’s critique. He crudely presents
empiricism  as  a  theory  which  requires  direct,  i.e.  subjective,  experience  as  the
precondition for establishing whether something can truly be known. Assuming that this
is a claim which is more or less implied – though not consistently – in every pragmatist
theory, Lovejoy starts to draw the respective consequences for the epistemic status of the
past in “the pragmatist’s” theory of knowledge. He writes: 
The status of my past experience, from the point of view of a present judgment or
inquiry concerning it, is precisely the same as the status of a contemporaneous but
extra-subjective reality.  Neither the one nor the other can now or hereafter  be
directly experienced;  of  neither is  the reality accessible  to verification.  If,  then,
truth is an experienced relation, true judgments about the bygone are as impossible
as true judgments about such ‘transempirical’ objects […]; for the past term of the
relation is also, qua past, a kind of ‘transempirical’ […]. The past cannot be known
because, since it is ex hypothesi now inaccessible to us. We can never compare it with
our idea of it, nor determine which of our ideas of it are true or false. (Lovejoy 1920:
66)
13 The  basis  for  this  conclusion  is  a  long  quotation  from Dewey’s  “A  Short  Catechism
Concerning Truth” (1910) – but it is hard to see where in this piece Lovejoy finds the
hypothesis he ascribes to Dewey. Dewey argues that the past, as with anything else that is
not immediately present, becomes inaccessible if treated in abstraction from the concrete
situation of a present inquiry. He attacks the “intellectualist” account of truth, by which
he means a correspondence-theory of truth, for being unable to show how a judgment
comes to land “straight on the devoted head of something past and gone” (Dewey 1910:
160)11 which is the reason why it is forced to talk about “transcendence.” Against this
Dewey defends a theory which takes “truth” to be a function of statements about events
as distinguished from the events themselves. Accordingly, events only become “true” in
terms of a judgment about them.12 Although at this point Dewey says nothing about how
knowledge seeks access into events and objects which are not themselves present in a
given moment, it does not follow that he denies the very possibility of such access – in
fact, the opposite is the case.
14 What Lovejoy misconstrues in the above quotations is the very notion of experience on
which pragmatism as  instrumentalism is  built.  By  regarding experience  as  thoroughly
subjective – a position that may be commonly held, but is at odds with the pragmatist
conception  –  he  puts  it  in  opposition  to  objective  facts.  Against  this  common
misconception a  counter-interpretation can be  given:  According  to  the  experimental
logic of inquiry, experience allows for the creation of criteria which make it possible to
decide if a belief is supported by some kind of material evidence or not. And although it is
impossible to subjectively experience the past event itself, this is not even necessary in
order to have experiential access to it: The very existence of the past event in question as
much as its relevant features (relevant in terms of the question asked about it) can be
inferred from presently experienced events as signs. While this take on accessing the past
remains implicit  in Dewey’s  Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  it  becomes very clear  in the
introduction to the second edition of Experience and Nature from 1929 (which Lovejoy,
admittedly, could not have known at the time). Here, Dewey gives the following example:
A geologist living in 1928 tells us about events that happened not only before he
was born but millions of years before any human being came into existence on this
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earth. He does so by starting from things that are now the material of experience.
Lyell[13] revolutionized  geology by  perceiving  that  the  sort  of  thing  that  can be
experienced now in operations of fire, water, pressure, is the sort of thing by which
the earth took on its present structural forms […]. The geologist did not leap from
the thing he can see and touch to some event in by-gone ages;  he collated this
observed thing with many others, of different kinds, found all over the globe; the
results of his comparison he then compared with data of other experiences, say the
astronomer’s.  He  translates,  that  is,  observed  coexistences  into  non-observed,
inferred sequences. Finally he dates his object, placing it in an order of events. By
the same sort of method he predicts [!] that at certain places some things not yet
experienced will be observed, and then he takes pains to bring them within the
scope of experience. (Dewey 1958: 4a)
15 This prediction of observability is another expression for the future consequences which
prove the truth of an idea about a past event, as Dewey already put it in another passage
of the “Catechism.” 14 In contrast to the ambiguities of the latter text, which is composed
as a rather dogmatic (though somewhat ironically intended) dialogue between a teacher
and a student,15 the passage from Experience and Nature makes very clear that the kind of
experiences  Dewey is  concerned with are not  private  or  merely  subjective ones,  but
public or intersubjective. It also shows that “the past” is by no means an inaccessible
realm of transempiricals, as Lovejoy is convinced the pragmatist was compelled to hold. It
is only Lovejoy himself who is bound to such a static conception of the past since his
correspondence-theory affords a comparison of  an idea about the past  with the past
“itself” and thus makes the whole matter a question of metaphysical realism.16 As the
example of the geologist – which vividly depicts the decisive trait of the pragmatist’s take
on knowledge – shows, however, the issue at stake relates to methodological principles of
inquiry, i.e.  about the epistemic techniques applied to a certain problem, rather than
notions of abstract realism. These techniques do not simply presuppose the reality of past
things as static comparable parameters “out there,” they rather try to find out what can
be conceived as real in the first place by compiling evidence and making inferences from
it. In any inquiry of the past, and especially in historical inquiry, the reality of a past
event is first of all an assumption that needs proof: Either the inquirer is already sure that
something did happen (be it ten or a million years ago) and tries to find out what exactly
it was and how it happened; or the inquirer asks whether an assumed event happened at
all, and if not, what happened instead.
16 Now this instrumentalistic conception of a pragmatist theory of knowledge, which in fact
can account  for  knowledge  of  the  past,  is  free  from  any  concession  to  “radical
empiricism” and thus meets this crucial demand of Lovejoy’s critique – while refuting his
allegation concerning “the pragmatist’s unwillingness to classify retrospection as true
knowledge” (Lovejoy 1920: 65). Although Lovejoy’s call for a general “rectification” of
pragmatism and the respective theory of knowledge points in the wrong direction, he
nevertheless  brought  to  the  fore  the  underlying  question which is  still  left  open:  If
knowledge  is  essentially  anticipatory,  how  can  the  past  be  anticipated?  Although  my
interpretation of Dewey’s example from Experience and Nature seeks to steer the course of
Dewey’s theory into this direction,  Lovejoy is  surely right that “the time-distinctions
pertinent to this inquiry” (Lovejoy 1920: 79) are not yet made precise. He is also right that
Dewey’s tendency to produce ambiguities in his writings which make it difficult – though
not impossible – to reconstruct his theory of knowledge, especially without concessions
to “subjectivism.” Therefore, I will now turn to the most elaborate theory of knowledge
provided by an adherent of the pragmatist tradition, a theory which is unambiguously
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opposed to the attitude of radical empiricism and at the same time acutely aware of the
consequences of an anticipatory concept of knowledge. This theory has been provided by
C. I. Lewis in terms of his “conceptual pragmatism.”
 
II. A Response by C. I. Lewis
17 On the occasion of a meeting of the American Philosophical Association in New York City
in 1929 Clarence Irving Lewis,  who had recently  published Mind and the  World  Order,
looked back on the development of  pragmatism and tried to place it  within current
thought. Without mentioning the name of Arthur O. Lovejoy, the infamous intervention
of the “Thirteen Pragmatisms” serves Lewis as the starting point for his reflection: “That
there should be thirteen distinguishable pragmatisms, however, is not a peculiarity: these
could be set alongside the thirty-seven idealisms and fifty-one realisms” (Lewis 1970a:
78). He adds that “William James is reported to have said that he was pleased to find that
pragmatism had this  wealth of  meaning;  he  accepted all  thirteen.  In  any case,  such
variety merely marks the fact that pragmatism is a movement,  not a system” (Lewis
1970a: 78). This movement, however, is not completely without a common denominator,
although it cannot be fixed in a single claim: “Pragmatism is, as James indicated, not a
doctrine but a method” (Lewis 1970a: 79), and the condensed principle of this method is
the pragmatic test of significance, which refers to the difference a notion makes in terms
of the pragmatic effects it bears (or does not bear). 
18 While  Lewis  is  stealing  the  thunder  of  Lovejoy’s  attacks  and  defends  the  idea  of
pragmatism as a method, it  becomes clear from his talk (which was published in the
Journal  of  Philosophy in 1930)  that his  own adherence to pragmatism is,  however,  not
without reservations. These concern the “highly subjectivistic theory of knowledge as
immediate”  (Lewis  1970a:  81)  one  might  arrive  at,  if  the emphasis  on  the  directly
empirical  receives  too  much  weight.  Lewis,  in contrast,  stresses  the  meaning  of  a
functional theory  of  knowledge,  which  analyzes  the  use  of  concepts  as  the  basic
instruments of thinking – while leaving out the immediate altogether. “We must all be
pragmatists,”  Lewis  declares  his  conviction,  “but  pragmatists  in  the  end,  not  in  the
beginning” (Lewis 1929: 267).
19 In  this  sense Lewis  is  taking up Lovejoy’s  demand for  a  pragmatism without  radical
empiricism.  But  in  contrast  to  Lovejoy,  Lewis  also  elaborates  a  positive  vision  of
pragmatism as “conceptual pragmatism” which he presents as the Outline of a Theory of
Knowledge (this is the subtitle of Mind and the World Order).  This book presents a very
unorthodox reading of and contribution to the pragmatist tradition since it does not only
emphasizes the importance of conceptual interpretation, but also dares to reanimate the
a priori as an indispensable element of knowledge. He thereby suggests a constructive
way of dealing with topics which were usually attributed to idealism by giving them a
pragmatic  twist.  Lewis  holds,  in  short,  that  knowledge  consists  of  two  functional
elements,  the empirical  and the a priori,  of  which only the a priori  element is  truly
pragmatic.  Before  experience  can  even  begin  to  be  intelligible,  it  needs  criteria
(definitions, principles) supplied by deep-lying attitudes of thinking to interpret given
presentations.  These criteria determine “reality” which in Lewis’  theory translates as
“experience categorized” (Lewis 1929: 365). Consequently, these criteria of categorization
are not derived from, but applied to concrete experience, giving some kind of order to it.
Lewis does not claim that the a priori element in knowledge comes from above; on the
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contrary, he holds that the human mind determines the categories it uses relative to its
purposes. The intension or intrinsic meaning of categories is stable, they are “absolute”
as Lewis likes to put it in a certain idealist vocabulary,17 but they are constantly tested in
application. If they do not serve the mind’s purposes of making the empirical intelligible,
they  are  discarded and replaced by  others.  Categories  are  restrictive,  but  their  own
boundaries in application are set by the “qualia of the given” (Lewis 1929: 157).18 Thus the
choice of  categories – which is  also contingent upon historical  change as regards the
actual set of accessible and plausible categories19 – is the fundamentally pragmatic aspect
of knowledge. And every pragmatic choice of a certain category, i.e. every conceptual
interpretation of something that is presented to the mind as given, implies a hypothesis
about the anticipated outcome of its application.
20 As Lewis is very much aware,  a theory which is based on an anticipatory concept of
knowledge must also explain how it can account for knowledge of the past: 
It is a frequent criticism of the type of theory here outlined that it cannot account
for  our  knowledge  of  the  past.  Knowledge,  it  is  said,  is  here  identified  with
verification,  and verification comes about by some proceeding from the present
into  the  future.  Thus  the  past,  so  far  as  it  can  be  known,  is  transformed  into
something present and future, and we are presented with the alternatives, equally
possible, that the past cannot be known or that it really is not past. (Lewis 1929:
149)
21 Although Lovejoy’s name is again not explicitly mentioned, it is reasonable to assume that
he is the author (or at least one of the authors) of the criticism Lewis rephrases here.
Lewis seems to repeat the conclusion of Lovejoy’s paper from 1920 as he admits that a
complete answer to this  criticism would require a metaphysical  analysis  of  temporal
categories. Instead of such a “complete” answer, Lewis presents several of considerations
that serve as an epistemologically sufficient response. The initial consideration holds that
to have knowledge of the past at all does not require to know everything that can possibly
be known about the past: “If, then, we assert that, from the point of view of knowledge,
the past is so and so, this is not to deny to the past various types of significance not
included in such an epistemological account” (Lewis 1929:  150).  Lewis starts with the
simple fact that the past, or aspects of it, are in general verifiable – because “there could
not be any item of the past which is intrinsically unverifiable.” This verification can only
happen in the present or future. It does not follow, however, that the past itself was
thereby transformed into something present or future, as the critics – like Lovejoy – seem
to suggest. It only means the assignment of a temporal locus to an object or event which
is  known by means of  its  effects.  In  Lewis’  words:  “The assumption that  the past  is
intrinsically verifiable means that at any date after the happening of the event, there is
always something, which at least is conceivably possible of experience, by means of which
it can be known” (Lewis 1929: 151). Lewis calls this “something” the effects of the past
event which endure after it  has ceased to exist,  and states that the “totality of such
effects quite obviously constitute[s] all of the object that is knowable” (Lewis 1929: 151).
My reading of Lewis’ rather short remarks about these effects is that the way in which
they represent the past object must be conceived as a material extension which is literally
identified with the past object. To say the effect is identified with the past event does not
mean it was identical with it – for the event and its extension are not simply the same. A
finger print or a sample of DNA are not identical with the person who left it, still, the
person  and  the  print  or  sample  are  mutually  identified:  the  one  makes  the  other
identifiable. Likewise, the fragments of a Roman temple are not strictly identical with the
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corresponding  religion  or  the  totality  of  the  bygone  Roman civilization,  but,  as  the
concrete parts of the whole, they are identifiable with reference to this religion and thus
identify the very civilization which once settled here. Lewis’ own way to make this point
“that the event is spread throughout all  after time” makes use of a comparison with
modern physics where it is said that “the field of an electronic charge is spread through
all  space  and  that  this  field  is the  electron”  (Lewis  1929:  151-2).  Accordingly,  what
cognition  apprehends  in  the  enduring  effects  of  a  past  event  “and  what  historical
knowledge proceeds to verify, is a part of its [i.e. the past event’s] nature” (Lewis 1929:
152). 
22 I  read the predication expressed by “is” (as in “this field is the electron”) and Lewis’
reference  to  the  “nature”  of  the  event  as  a  logical  “is”  and  a  functional  “nature.”
Although the identity of present effects and past event means a material identity (instead
of a formal, ultimately arbitrary representation), this identity is differential or partial:
The effect does not exhaust the event, but it means the event since it belongs to it as one
of its parts and thus concretely presents it. I regard this relation of effects and past events
as a logical inseparable relation. Just like the present light of a collapsed star is logically
inseparable from this very star which ceased to exist, a book written in a “dead” language
is  inseparable  from  the  culture  in  which  this  language  was  a  vital  means  of
communication.  Of  course,  taken  merely  as  light  or  simply  as  a  bulk  of  paper  the
meanings of these phenomena cannot be understood as the effects of something; but the
moment they are comprehended as such evident effects of events that are temporally
prior to them, they also become logically bound to these events. In other words, although
the book can be seen in abstraction from being a leftover, its status as an effect strictly
implies20 the bygone linguistic system it presents. Obviously, the reverse does not follow:
The bygone linguistic system does not imply this specific materialization of it; but it does
imply that there must be some materialized expressions – just like the book found in some
archive or the carved stone found in an archeological excavation.
23 The assumption about the logical inseparability of present effects and past events, which
I find in Lewis, prevents his theory of knowledge from transforming the object “into some
incognizable ding an sich” (Lewis 1929: 151). Furthermore, it sets the boundaries which
condition the possibilities  of  knowledge of  the past.  As  already quoted above,  “[t]he
totality of such effects quite obviously constitute[s] all of the object that is knowable”
(Lewis  1929:  151),  which  means  that  if  all  effects  have  been  detected,  no  further
knowledge is possible than that which can be gained from these effects.  But if  more
effects occur, there is more to be known. It is of course hard to say when exactly the point
of exhaustion is met, therefore a “for the time being” clause is usually advisable. But in
many cases it  is  easy to see that  there is  a  limited number of  detectible effects,  for
instance if there is only one document in a certain language no one speaks anymore, or if
wide portions of a collection were destroyed so as to restrict the respective research and
possible knowledge about it  to only a few relicts.  In any case,  it  is  not  necessary to
actually exhaust “all of the object that is knowable” in order to have true knowledge of a
past  event21 since  partial  knowledge  already  is knowledge.  Furthermore,  relevant
knowledge – relevant in terms of an answer to a specific question asked about the object –
is partial by definition, because not everything that is knowable, but only certain aspects
of it, can contribute to the purpose of answering a given question.
24 Recognizing that past events “are knowable ‘after they occur’ because their appearances
or effects are ‘there’ at a later date to be experienced” (Lewis 1929: 152) stops short of
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explaining how these effects of the past are identified in the first place. Lewis concedes
that  his  account  would  have  to  reveal  “by  analysis  of  experience,  those  peculiar
characteristics by which the pastness of a thing is presently identified” (Lewis 1929: 153),
but  confines  himself  to  the  statement  of  principles,  which  is  perfectly  apt  for  an
epistemological outline. On this in principle level it is sufficiently clear that knowledge of
the past, attained by means of present effects, includes the knowledge that the object
known is itself in the past. In other words, it is “known through a correct interpretation
of something given, including certain given characters which are the marks of pastness”
(Lewis 1929: 153). To treat something as a characteristic of pastness is an assumption
made in the course of inquiry and, as always, to be verified by the anticipated proof of
further experience.
25 Consequently,  knowledge  about  the  past  is  first  and  foremost  the  knowledge  of
something as being a sign or characteristic of the past – which means that the basic
cognitive function in this respect is the assignment of a temporal locus from the point of
view of a present situation.22 Within that situation the characteristics of the past are by
no means “transempirical,” but concretely present and experienced. For Lewis the past is
everything but the abstract sum of the strictly bygone; it is precisely what has left all
those traces behind which can now be taken as the starting point and evidence for asking
questions  about  the  “nature”  of  this  very  past.  Based  on  these  traces  (or  marks  of
pastness, as Lewis says) there is no mystery in claiming that the past can be and must be
anticipated – not as something to happen, but as something to be known. Accordingly, if
retrospection shall  be used as a name for justified knowledge of the past,  as Lovejoy
promoted, it cannot mean an unqualified attempt to “look back,” but rather the process
of hypothesizing: making well-grounded assumptions and using the evidence at hand to
inferentially prove these right or wrong, always aiming at further proof and always ready
for revision. In short, if retrospection means knowledge (and not just contemplation) it is
really anticipation.
26 To sum up the major insights about knowledge of the past to be drawn from Lewis’
theory: The past is extending into the present23 by means of its enduring effects which are
identifiable  by  certain  marks  of  pastness  (while  leaving  open  how  these  marks  are
identified concretely).  The past  can be known by using these material  extensions  as
evidence for assumptions which await future corrections or proof. Since Lewis left open
the more concrete conditions of the process in which knowledge of the past is gained, I
will  now  turn  to  Edgar  Wind’s  contribution  on  history  as  inquiry.  Wind  not  only
complements  Lewis’  epistemological  achievement,  but  also  draws  some  resolute
consequences concerning the interdependent relationship between the past as extending
into the present and the past as something to be reconstructed by intruding into it. These
consequences concern especially the difference a past situation will make in the future.
 
III. Edgar Wind on Historical Inquiry: Intruding into the
Past (and its Future)
27 What,  then,  are the specific  features of  the knowledge-experience that is  attained in
historical  inquiry? According to Edgar Wind,  the general  way in which knowledge is
gained in the modes of history and natural science is indeed the same. And this holds not
only in principle, but to a certain extend even in practice; it only differs in terms of the
material items used as tools in the process of inquiry. 
The Anticipated Past in Historical Inquiry
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, VIII-2 | 2016
11
28 Wind, born in Berlin in 1900, was a gifted scholar who started his academic career as a
philosopher  and  later  became  an  art  historian  in  the  Warburgian  style  of
Kulturwissenschaft (and the first to become professor of art history at the University of
Oxford). After receiving his PhD from Hamburg University, where he studied with Ernst
Cassirer and Erwin Panofsky, Wind moved to the United States where he spent four years
(between  1924  and  1928)  working  as  a  teacher  in  New  York  and  as  a  lecturer  of
philosophy at  the University of  North Carolina at  Chapel  Hill.24 During this  time,  he
became  closely  acquainted  with  the  American  philosophical  scene  of  the  1920s  and
especially with the pragmatist tradition. He was strongly impressed by the writings of
Charles S. Peirce which were just made available by Morris R. Cohen’s famous edition
Chance, Love, and Logic from 1923. Peirce’s essay on “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” became
something of a model for Wind’s book about Experiment and Metaphysics,25 which he wrote
after returning to Hamburg. In 1926 Wind attended the Sixth International Congress of
Philosophy  at  Harvard  University  where  he  presented  a  paper  which  set  out  the
principles presented in his later book.  Among the many renowned philosophers who
attended this congress (including Dewey, Whitehead, Weyl, Hartmann, Lévy-Bruhl, Croce
and  many  more)  were  also  Lovejoy  and  Lewis,  although  the  latter  did  not  give  a
presentation at the congress.26 Lovejoy spoke about “The Meaning of ‘Emergence’ and its
Modes” (1927) in a session on emergent evolution to which Wind later refers in his own
discussion of constancy and emergency.27 However, it is not clear to what extent Wind
engaged with Lovejoy’s work28 and if he took any notice of Lovejoy’s earlier criticism of
the pragmatist theory of knowledge. By contrast, the influence of Lewis is more evident
since Wind directly refers to Lewis’  paper on “The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge”
(1970c), which is an earlier version of a central chapter of Mind and the World Order.29 John
Michael  Krois  even  goes  so  far  as  to  claim that  Lewis’  thoughts  on  the  historically
changing pragmatic conditions of a priori concepts ultimately led Wind to revise the kind
of Kantianism30 that was so very strong in his home country and especially among his
teachers.
29 Be that as it may, Wind tries to combine the pragmatic ideas he gained during his early
years in America with the basic insights of the philosophy of culture as developed by his
teacher Ernst Cassirer and relates these ideas to the problem of how history and cultural
inquiry generate knowledge.  In a paper which was included in a collection of  essays
presented to Cassirer at the occasion of his 60th birthday, Wind explored “Some Points of
Contact between History and Natural Science” (1936).  Although this paper presents a
brief outline of a potentially path-breaking account on the philosophy of inquiry, which
entails a bridging of the needless gap between “science” and “humanities,” it had – like
all  of  Wind’s  philosophical  writings  –  almost  no  impact  on  the  philosophical,
historiographical, and scientific community.31 
30 Objecting  to  the  common  separation  of  “science”  and  “humanities”  (or
“Naturwissenschaft“ and “Geisteswissenschaft”), Wind argues that both fields of inquiry
entail  the same mode of using epistemic instruments.  The basic suggestion of Wind’s
position consists in the functional equation of two kinds of investigational tools, namely
scientific instruments and historical documents, which are themselves part of the very
matter they are “measuring.” An instrument of experimental investigations into a certain
sphere of  the physical  world,  say of  temperature,  must itself  participate in this very
sphere of the physical world: it must be a physical thing which is sensitive to changes in
temperature in order to be able to continuously react to such changes and be able to
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represent these on a scale.32 Likewise, the documents which are the means of historical
investigations  must  themselves  be  parts  of  the  historical  world  and  the  particular
historical situation they are representing. For example, the Rosetta Stone is a presently
existing physical thing that embodies a practice of translation it was once part of and
thus  allows  for  the  investigation  of historic  encounters  of  Greek  and  Egypt  ancient
cultures. 
31 Thus  the  process  of  inquiry,  not  only  in  history  but  also  in  natural  science(s),33 is
unavoidably circular: one must already presuppose the historical or physical situation
which is  investigated in order to recognize some material  thing to be a part of  that
situation. Once such a thing has been recognized, it can be used to understand the very
situation which was already presupposed. This kind of circularity – which Wind describes
in  detail  for  the  experimental  sciences  in  his  outstanding  book  on  Experiment  and
Metaphysics34 –  is  not “vicious,” meaning a mere logical  mistake,  but the unavoidable
condition of every kind of (scientific) inquiry as conducted by the ever limited, but ever
extendable human understanding. In other words, inquiry never starts from scratch, but
on  the  grounds  of  what  we  already  know,  assume  and  presuppose.  The  claim  to
knowledge, which remains essential to the practice of inquiry, is secured by treating not
only the explicit assumptions of a given research project, but virtually every supposition
implied in the process as a system of hypotheses. The idea of hypothesis has to be taken
very seriously in terms of testable, decidable assumptions – unlike neutral or indifferent
propositions, which are not decidable, but simply die off over time.35 (This is precisely the
passage  where  Wind,  though  mainly  discussing  Poincaré,  directly  refers  to  the
aforementioned paper by C. I. Lewis.) 
32 The functional equivalence of documents and instruments does not mean that there are
no significant differences – though these differences, as Wind’s paper makes very clear,
are gradual, not essential. One significant difference, which is of particular interest here,
concerns those aspects Lewis calls the marks of pastness.  Unlike the purely technical
instruments of natural inquiry, the historical documents Wind has in mind necessarily
show such marks of pastness: In order to “be” historical documents they first have to be
recognized as participating in a past reality, a past state of human affairs. Before the
Rosetta Stone is understood as documenting a remote trilingual cultural encounter, it is a
mere stone;  but it  becomes a document as soon as some scholar recognizes that the
unusual grooves on its surface display a script, even different scripts arranged in parallel
order.  The scholar is  able to know that  because s/he already knows something about
script, something about the place, where the stone was found, and especially something
about the history of ancient Egypt and Greece. But furthermore, as soon as s/he uses the
Rosetta Stone as a means for finally translating hieroglyphs (which s/he was until now
unable to decipher) into Greek letters (which s/he already knew), this document is used as
a powerful instrument of knowledge of the past.
33 In order to have a definition it can be stated, first, that all documents, if used in inquiry,
are instruments; and second, that they are instruments of a specific kind, carrying the
marks of pastness. But while all documents are (potential) instruments, the reverse does
not follow. If a drilling machine that is used as an instrument in geological research is
taken as a purely technical instrument for the extraction of a sample of sediments deep in
the soil, it is not itself documenting anything about the past of the planet. However, the
sample  extracted  by  use  of  the  drilling  machine  is  clearly  a  document,  a  material
extension and representation of the past and thus a (non-technical) epistemic instrument
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of knowledge of the earth’s past (as well as of the subsequent present condition of the
planet). In any case, the decision whether a thing is an instrument of the technical or of
the documentary kind is a decision that is made in the practical use of the respective
item. Even the drilling machine can become a document if it is treated as representing a
certain stage in the history of engineering and of drilling in particular, or in the history
of  invasive  methods  in  experimental  geology  (in  contrast  to  methods  of  computer
simulation,  for  instance).  In  other  words,  “instrument”  is  the  generic  term  which
encompasses the specific terms of technical instruments and documents. When it comes
to practical decisions in the process of inquiry these different kinds of instruments are
not only equivalent, they are interrelated and enhance each other: Technical instruments
help identify and obtain documents that might themselves become “technical” devices
(like  the  Rosetta  Stone  becomes  a  medium  of  translation),  whereas  the  technical
instruments might in turn become documents of past technologies.
34 Now the most striking aspect of Wind’s essay becomes apparent as he asserts that “[t]he
investigator intrudes into the process that he is investigating” (Wind 1936: 258). He further
explains this statement as follows:
This intrusion, of which every investigator must be guilty if he wishes to make any
sort  of  contact  with  his  material  and  to  test  the  rules  of  his  procedure,  is  a
thoroughly real  event.  A  set  of  instruments  is  being  inserted,  and  the  given
constellation  is  thereby  disturbed.  The  physicist  disturbs  the  atoms  whose
composition he wants to study. The historian disturbs the sleep of the document
that he drags forth from a dusty archive. This word ‘disturbance’ is not to be taken
as a metaphor, but is meant literally […]. To the historian it might, indeed, sound
like  a  metaphor  if  he  is  told  that  the  document  is  disturbed  by  him.  For
involuntarily  he  pictures  it  as  a  material  piece  of  paper,  which  does  not  mind
whether it is lying in a cupboard or on a table. However, if we look upon it as an
historical object, and consider its present status –viz. how it has been discarded and
forgotten  –  as  part  of  the  historic  process  itself,  then  this  process  is  indeed
‘disturbed’ by him who brings the forgotten words back to memory. (Wind 1936:
261)
35 Using the example of  an unpleasant  disclosure of  some hero’s  weakness  (looking on
recent philosophical discussions one may think of the case of Heidegger here36), Wind
makes clear that by disturbance he means “a factual alteration of our belief” and that “no
historical  inquiry  is  ever  undertaken  without  the  intention  of  creating  such  a
disturbance”  (Wind 1936:  262).  So  the  purpose  of  historical  inquiry  is  to  disturb  an
historical situation in order to find out how this situation is like and how it has changed
now  that  it  is  disturbed.  This  kind  of  disturbance  is  analogous  to  the  methods  of
experimental  physics where atoms and quanta are disturbed in order to reveal  their
nature,  and  where  measurement  necessarily  means  modification.37 In  this  sense,  a
discovery is nothing but the reaction of the studied object to what is implemented into it
by the investigator.38 From this invasive (or simply experimental) concept of historical
inquiry it follows that the past is neither “dead and gone,” but instrumentally accessible,
nor “blankly there,” but needs to be disturbed in order to reveal what is there to be
known about it. Both happens by means of the embodiments of a past situation (which
are, as I like to put it, the material extensions of the past into the present) which serve as
evidence for future findings about it. To say that the past extends and is thus accessible
and real, and to say at the same time that it is not immediately given, but needs to be
disclosed trough documents, amounts to a position – namely Wind’s position – which
bridges the gap between “instrumentalism” and “realism.” Although these two “isms” are
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usually taken as counterparts in philosophical discourse, it must be acknowledged that
they  are  deeply  and  necessarily  intertwined.  To  paraphrase  Wind’s  suggestion:  The
reality of the past, which is embodied in a document, is the (metaphysical) precondition
for the instrumental status of this very document.
36 The consequences from all this for the anticipation of the past can be summarized in the
following three interrelated aspects: 
• Hypothesis and proof. To deploy a hypothesis about a past event is to anticipate the outcome
of its proof. In other words, this means the anticipation of our future knowledge about the
past  and its  impact  on subsequent action.  With Wind’s  paper it  becomes clear how this
knowledge is attained: It is developed from what the inquirer already knows and what s/he
for this reason assumes in a methodically justifiable manner, which means to introduce a
hypothesis into the circle of inquiry in order to change what s/he already knows. Since the
methodical justifiability relies on the documents as pars pro toto and evidence of the past, the
hypothesis  –  the  question  whether  the  assumption  is  correct  –  is  invested  into  these
documents as epistemic instruments. 
• Anticipating the present as becoming past. If there are extensions of the past into the present, it
is also clear that the present will extend into the future and will thus become past. To treat
the present by anticipating its future pastness is to take the historical standpoint towards
the present. This loop of the self-reflective circle is not explicitly discussed in Wind’s paper,
but it is an obvious consequence of his argument: Anticipating the future discovery of a
present situation means to reckon not only with its enduring consequences, but also with its
disturbance  and  re-evaluation  in  the  light  of  the  now  unapparent  evidence,  which  will
survive.  One  might  regard  this  as  a  specifically  ethical  implication  of  anticipating  the
(present as) past,39 but it also articulates an epistemological insight: In contrast to the idea
that the past was widely inaccessible, because it is gone, this perspective makes clear that
the present will first be understood as soon as it is ceases to be present, i.e. as soon as one
can take distance towards it, which is a precondition for knowledge altogether.40
• Anticipating the transformation of ourselves. Wind’s position not only bridges the assumed gap
between natural science and history, showing that the latter is as much a science as the
former, both equally entangled in hermeneutic circles; he also aims at linking the theory of
knowledge, as derived from these modes of inquiry, to the problem of cultural self-reflection
and the self-transformation of human kind.41 This truly pragmatist attitude is supported by
his  claim that  historical  inquiry  is  always  guided by the intention to  disturb.  Historical
inquiry is in other words driven by the anticipation of the effects its discoveries will have on
the conduct of social life, as it intrudes into the self-conception of a social group. It not only
reckons with the past to be a different past in the future, it also anticipates that as the past
changes, “we”  change  (whereas  “we”  means  simply  those  who  are  affected  by  it).  For
example: As soon as we find out about the influence some anti-democratic forces had on the
very democratic constitution we are the heirs and adherents of, this changes our position
within such a legacy and we suddenly become different democrats. However, these changes
may not always come up as a shock with immediate dramatic consequences, they may also
appear as rather slight alterations – still they are changes caused by inquiring the past.
37 Finally, the paradox of the claim that the past is anticipated vanishes completely as soon
as this claim is supported by what Wind calls the configural progression of time. Wind
articulates this concept42 mainly in negative terms as opposed to the dominant idea of
linear  progression according  to  which time is  regarded as  a  continuous,  mechanical
unfolding of strictly consecutive stages. Positively defined, configural progression means
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the  constant  reshaping  of  relations  in  time  and  accounts  for  possibly  overlapping
sequences (instead of discrete stages). It thus allows us to conceive of time structures
which are internal to the phenomena of a given investigation, be it in history or modern
physics, and gives a “sense for periodicity”43 which is omitted in the externalist concept
of linear time. A concept like this is necessary in order to account for the emergent
symbolic interrelations of historical (as well as physical) events, and also for the specific
conditions under which a past meaning or figuration “survives”44 and is transformed in
and through cultural changes and the intrusions of investigators. A linear concept, based
on the idea of causal “chains,” is simply unfit for this task. This is precisely what Lovejoy
did not see in his criticism of the anticipatory concept of knowledge which was ultimately
based on the linear understanding, thus committing what can be called the fallacy of
linear time progression.45
38 Wind’s concept of the configural progression of time comprises his understanding of the
vibrant debate on “emergence” following Samuel Alexander’s and C. Lloyd Morgan’s (and
later also Whitehead’s) engagements into this subject-matter, and which was discussed by
Lovejoy in the aforementioned talk at the congress in 1926.46 The reference to emergence
is crucial for the configural concept because it opens the path for an understanding of
how  certain  past,  present  and  future  events  enter  into  configurations  which  create
meaning and have consequences – not because they strictly follow (from) each other, but
because they affect each other and thus create a specific new situation. It also introduces
(epistemic) chance and (ethical) freedom, “diversity of alternatives” and “the recognition
of different degrees of reliance” in acting,47 or simply contingency as undeniable factors
of progression. 
39 Thus, the configural concept of time makes conceivable the many ways in which past,
present, and future are closely intertwined instead of being mere successions of time
fractions. Based on this concept, historical inquiry appears to be concerned with the
consequences which emerge from disturbing a past event and from bringing it into new
epistemic constellations. In this way it is recognized that different consequences of a past
event make it a different kind of event, which means that the past will on the whole not
stay the same. Anticipation is a prerequisite of establishing the difference the past will
make in the future.
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NOTES
1. Cf.  Lovejoy  1924;  in  fn.  1  Lovejoy  summarizes  the  preceding  papers  which  constitute  the
debate.
2. Cf. Rydenfelt 2009, who defends James against Lovejoy’s reproaches.
3. This  bold attempt  did  of  course  not  remain  uncontested.  Explicit  reactions  appeared
immediately,  be it  in the form of a counter attack, as for example in a paper by Max Meyer
(1908),  or  by accepting the challenge for an analysis  of  the evolution of  pragmatism, like in
A. C. Armstrong’s paper on the matter (1908) – or both at the same time as in J. E. Boodin (1909).
Lovejoy’s  controversial  criticism  of  pragmatism  also  flowed  into  another  debate,  which
concerned the relation of pragmatism and realism. This debate was initiated by a series of papers
under  the  titular  question  “May  a  Realist  be  a  Pragmatist?”  by  William  P. Montague  –  a
prominent advocate of the “new realism” – which were published in The Journal of Philosophy in
1909.
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4. It was published as a chapter in a book entitled Essays in Critical Realism. A Co-operative Study of
the Problem of Knowledge. The treatises included in this volume document the cooperative project
of  a  group  of  renowned  American  philosophers  (namely  Durant  Drake,  James  Bissett  Pratt,
Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, Roy Wood Sellars, C. A. Strong and Lovejoy), who aimed at
launching a “critical” (though non-Kantian) period of realism in the United States, reacting to an
earlier volume by the “new realists” (Holt et al. 1912).
5. Lovejoy seems to construct a space of philosophical doctrines, in which the polar distinction of
monistic and dualistic positions intersects vertically with the distinction of realistic and idealistic
doctrines. 
6. Cf. Lovejoy (1920: 51-3).
7. Cf. Lovejoy (1920: 53).
8. In his quotation of this passage from Dewey, Lovejoy fails to give quotation marks Dewey puts
around the word “categories,” thus indicating that he is using the term rather as a metaphor.
9. Although Lovejoy later introduced his “analytic” method of the history of ideas, which treats
ideas as distinct units, which are (re-) combined with each other in the course of history, even
this method does not work on the grounds of a past, which is “blankly there,” but one which has
to  be  reconstructed and interpreted;  a  past,  in  which ideas,  even as  units,  have contexts  in
various fields of connections, uses, and connotations. So fortunately Lovejoy at least practically
discards this pseudo-realist notion of the past.
10. Sidney  Hook’s  The  Metaphysics  of  Pragmatism gives  a  clear  account  of  pragmatism  as
instrumentalism, drawing from Peirce and Dewey, while rejecting James’ (and F. C. S. Schiller’s)
views. Cf. Hook (1927: esp. 9).
11. Quoted in Lovejoy (1920: 66).
12. Cf. Dewey (1910: 160-1).
13. Charles Lyell (1797-1875), British geologist, author of Principles of Geology (1830-33).
14. Cf. Dewey (1910: 162); and Lovejoy (1920: 68).
15. The  “Catechism”  even  includes  a  very  infelicitous  remark  on  “the  personal  milk”  the
pragmatist had spilled “in the absolutist’s cocoanut” which cannot avoid supporting Lovejoy’s
complaint about the “subjectivistic strain.” See, Dewey (1910: 168).
16. He also tries to make the problem about the decision between monism and dualism – which is
what Dewey takes up in response to Lovejoy, cf. Dewey 1922.
17. Cf. for example Lewis (1929: 167).
18. Lewis is famous for introducing the term “qualia” which, however, can already be found in
Peirce.
19. Cf. Lewis (1929: 271-2).
20. The theorem or system of strict implication was established by Lewis in his Survey of Symbolic
Logic (1918). Given the complexity of Lewis’ formal analysis of strict implication my reference to
it is rather superficial. I am using the term in the general sense that it is impossible that p (the
effect) and not q (the event).
21. Such a claim to exclusive truth is an exaggeration of a certain kind of idealist epistemology, cf.
Lewis (1929: 150).
22. Cf. Lewis (1929: 151).
23. By this  phrase I  am alluding to  Nicolai  Hartmann who uses  the term “Hineinragen.”  Cf.
Hartmann (1949: esp. 546). Although Hartmann’s account would be very useful in this context, it
will have to be discussed elsewhere. 
24. Wind spent another extended period of his life in the USA as he became professor of art and
philosophy  first  at  the  University  of  Chicago  (1942-1944)  and  then  at  Smiths  College  in
Northampton (1944-1955) before moving to Oxford.
25. Cf. Wind (2001: 6).
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26. The attendance of Lewis, who at the time was a professor at Harvard, is asserted by Krois
(2011: 11).
27. Cf. Wind (2001: 113, fn. 89).
28. Although this is strongly suggested by Buschendorf (2000: 298-9).
29. Cf. Wind (2001: 32).
30. Cf.  Krois  (2011:  11-2).  Krois  assumes that  Wind already knew Lewis’  paper  “A Pragmatic
Conception of the A Priori” from 1923 (1970b) – which is indeed quite likely.
31. Surprisingly, Hannah Arendt acknowledges the merits of Wind’s argument in a footnote of
her paper on “The Modern Concept of History” from 1958, where she remarks: “It seems strange
that so fundamental and obvious an argument [like Wind’s] should have played no role in the
subsequent methodological and other discussions of historical science” Arendt (1958: 590). Many
thanks to Sascha Freyberg for calling my attention to this passage.
32. For a contemporary account on the complex history and logic of the thermometer cf. van
Fraassen  (2008:  115-39,  esp.  125-30),  where  van  Fraassen  gives  his  interpretation  of  Mach’s
account.
33. For some reason Wind uses the singular, natural science, perhaps in order to rhetorically
stage the presumed contrast between historical and “scientific” investigation.
34. After this book got Wind his Habilitation at the University of Hamburg under Ernst Cassirer
and Ernst Panofsky in 1929, it was first published in 1934. Being neglected over many decades, it
only reappeared in 2000 and was published in an English translation in 2001.
35. Cf. Wind (2001: 31-3).
36. Wind expressed his own criticism on the Heideggerian legacy in a polemic piece entitled
“Jean-Paul Sartre, A French Heidegger,” which is included as an appendix in Bredekamp 1998.
37. Cf. Wind (1936: 261-2). 
38. This principal of hermeneutics, which applies to natural science and history alike, Wind puts
as follows: “[I]n a competition between science and history, the historians would be sure to score
one point: in dealing with their symbols, they have long realized, what the physicist, dazzled by
the polished appearance of their equations, have only recently noticed; namely, that every
discovery regarding the objects of their inquiry reacts on the construction of their implements;
just as every alteration of the implements makes possible new discovery” (Wind 1936: 262).
39. By coincidence, Jürgen Habermas recently emphasized the importance of taking the future
historians  view on current  developments,  while  reflecting (mostly)  on the  Brexit  vote  in  an
interview on Die Zeit (Nr. 29/2016, 7. Juli 2016): “Of course, it’s only with hindsight that you learn
there could have been another way. But before throwing away an alternative before it’s even
been attempted one ought to try and imagine our current situation as the past present for a
future historian.” The quotation is taken from the English translation (by David Gow, with the
author’s approval), which is on: [socialeurope.eu/2016/07/core-europe-to-the-rescue/].
40. Arthur C. Danto has argued for a similar position, cf. Danto (2007: esp. 342-63).
41. Cf. Wind (1936: 263-4).
42. Cf.  Wind (2001:  97-115),  as  well  as  the typescript  of  his  last  lectures in Hamburg on the
foundational concepts of history and the philosophy of culture from 1932/33 which is stored in
the Bodleian Library in Oxford (MS. Wind 154, folder 2). A widely convincing interpretation of
Wind’s configural concept with extensive quotations from the lecture-typescript is presented by
Buschendorf (2000: 295-301).
43. “Konfig[uraler] Zeitbegriff gibt [ein] Gefühl für Periodizität.”
44. This  concerns  what  in  the  Warburgian  tradition  –  of  which  Wind  became  one  of  the
prominent proponents – is called “Nachleben.” For a reference to Warburg in the context of
configural time cf. Wind (1932/33: 18).
45. Wind considers the linear concept only as an impossible limit case of configural time, as a
certain kind of ideal configuration. Cf. Wind (2001: 104-5).
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46. From  a  Windian  perspective  Lovejoy’s  acknowledgment  of  emergence  (and  the  useful
distinctions he made within that concept) should lead him towards a configural understanding –
which he did not (yet) have when criticizing the anticipatory concept of knowledge.
47. “Die histor[ische] Geschichte sieht Vielfältigkeit der Alternativen. […] Labilität also führt zur
Anerkennung dieser versch[iedenen] Grade der Verbindlichkeit” (Wind 1932/33: 27).
ABSTRACTS
In this paper I argue that, from a pragmatist point of view, to know the past means to anticipate
it. Accordingly, historical inquiry is directed towards the future, namely the future of the past as
known.  I  develop this  argument in three steps:  (I.)  Starting with A.  O.  Lovejoy’s  criticism of
Dewey’s anticipatory theory of knowledge I defend the basic claim that all knowledge, including
knowledge of the past, is anticipatory (i.e. directed at future consequences). Lovejoy’s criticism
shows that Dewey’s statements invite misunderstandings, which have to be removed. (II.) I then
turn  to  C.  I.  Lewis’  enhanced  outline  of  a  pragmatist  theory  of  knowledge.  Lewis  provides
epistemological arguments regarding the structural features of knowledge of the past and argues
knowledge that is gained by the past’s present effects. (III.) Finally, I turn to a notable essay by E.
Wind  in  which  he  stresses  the  intrusive  and  future-oriented  character  of  historical  inquiry:
Documents  are used as  instruments  for  intruding into the past,  asking how the past  will  be
understood in the light of new or reconsidered evidence. This process involves anticipating the
effects that a different past will have on those affected by the history in question.
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